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Structural Change, Rents Transferring and Market Power in the International Coffee 
Market: A Time Series Analysis 
 
Introduction  
In recent years, Vector Error Correction (VEC) models have been applied to examine the 
dynamics of food and fiber markets. These applications have considered issues such as market 
efficiency in temporal and spatial dimensions (Sabuhoro and Larue, 1997; Yang and Leatham, 
1998), pricing strategies under oligopoly (Vickner and Davies, 2000), as well as price spreads of 
agricultural commodities (Chang and Griffith, 1998). This work shows how the use of VEC 
models can be extended to examine the dynamics of market structure and market power in 
international trade of agricultural commodities, focusing on the case of coffee.  
In developing countries, the value of coffee exports ranks second after oil, making this 
commodity an important source of foreign exchange. The international coffee market has 
experienced substantial changes in recent years. Before 1990, most coffee exporting countries 
were part of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) which fixed a system of export quotas to 
meet a target price above competitive prices (Bates, 1997). Importing countries supported ICA 
probably because they saw it as an efficient way to provide assistance to developing countries 
(Bohman, Jarvis and Barichello, 1996). In 1990, however, ICA was eliminated and exporters 
relied on competition to maintain or gain market share in international markets. We hypothesize 
that ICA’s elimination did not lead to competitive markets but instead to a transfer of market 
power from exporting countries to international wholesalers. The data are monthly coffee prices 
(dollars per pound) for the period January/1982 through January/2000 in the New York Stock 
Exchange (international price) and the consumer price (retail price) reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.   3 
The study follows three steps to assess the changes in the international coffee market. 
First, Box-Jenkins techniques are applied to examine the underlying stochastic process of 
producer and retail coffee prices time series. These analyses contribute to identify differences in 
price formation before and after ICA’s suspension. Next, a VEC model is estimated to analyze 
the long-run relationship between retail and producer coffee prices. Changes in the gap between 
these two variables (the marketing margin) indicate transfers of rents between economic agents 
participating in the international coffee market. Finally, tests of weak exogeneity on producer 
and retail prices contribute to determine whether exporting countries became price-takers after 
1990. 
Findings suggest that ICA’s elimination affected the stochastic process of producer 
prices, while that for retail prices did not change. Furthermore, the VEC model estimators 
indicate that the gap between retail and producer prices have increased in the long-run.  If the 
process of price formation has changed and transfer of rents has occurred, the question is what 
the resultant market structure is. Under ICA, exporting countries behaved as an oligopoly, and as 
a consequence exporting countries endogenized prices while consumers were price-takers. The 
tests of weak exogeineity for producer prices indicate that exporting countries lost market power 
after 1990. Changes in formation of international prices, increased marketing margins and loss of 
market power show a transfer of rents from coffee exporting countries to international 
wholesalers.  
 
Prices Structures and Structural Change in the Coffee Market 
Figure 1 suggests that falling coffee prices through 1995 were the result of a long-run 
trend not related the termination of the export quota system in 1990. Tests of structural change   4 
confirm this result.
1 Nevertheless, examination of the stochastic processes of price time series 
yields a different result.  
 
Figure 1. Actual Versus Predicted Coffee Prices 
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The first step is to examine the stochastic processes of retail and international price 
series. The Box-Jenkins iterative process of identification, estimation and diagnostic checking 
for the period 1982-2000 lead to an ARIMA(5,1,1) and ARIMA(0,1,1) for international (or 
                                                            
1 Models explaining international and retail prices as dependent variables were regressed with 
their own lags and production levels. Chow tests were not significant even at the 10% level and 
the dummy variable measuring the impact of the coffee agreement was not significant in any 
specification.   5 
producer) and retail prices respectively.
2 These specifications result in white noise residuals, 
minimize the Akaike Information Criterion as well as the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, and yield 
significant estimated coefficients. In addition, according to the Dickey-Fuller tests both 
international and retail price time series are integrated of order one, I(1). 
An alternative to traditional structural change tests (i.e., Chow) is the use of Box-Jenkins 
techniques to test whether price formation in the international coffee market changed after 1990. 
In particular, one can use information prior to 1990 to forecast subsequent monthly prices and 
compare them to actual prices for those months. Another possibility is to breakdown the analysis 
into two periods (before and after 1990) thus testing for differences in the stochastic process of 
prices between periods. These two approaches were performed. Figure 1 shows actual and 
predicted prices for the twelve months following the elimination of the export quota. It shows 
that the model predicted increased prices after 1990 when in fact both retail and producer prices 
continued falling. Although many other factors explain the gap between actual and forecasted 
prices, these forecasts contribute to characterize the problem and to further study changes in 
price formation.
3  
  Applying Box-Jenkins techniques to price time series before and after ICA’s dissolution 
leads to interesting results. Considering producer prices, the underlying process for the periods 
1982-1989 and 1990-2000 can be represented as an ARMA(1,1) and an ARIMA(5,1,0), 
respectively. As expected, these results suggest that something did change in the formation of 
                                                            
2 Coffee prices in the New York Stock exchange are considered the price received by exporting 
countries. 
3  The confidence interval for ARIMA processes is increasing in the number of forecasts and 
measurement errors also lead to deviations from actual price time series.    6 
producer prices after the elimination of the quota system. In contrast, the stochastic process of 
retail prices is the same ARIMA(0,1,1) for the two periods. Consequently, the relationship 
between producers and retail prices was also affected by the elimination of the coffee agreement. 
Summarizing, in contrast with the conclusions obtained from conventional tests, Box-
Jenkins procedures indicate that ICA did make a difference in the formation process of producer 
prices. It is possible that conventional tests of structural change are inconclusive because coffee 
prices were falling substantially prior to ICA’s dissolution and therefore, they fail to identify 
changes in the trend of the price time series. Accordingly, prices followed a different dynamics 
after 1990. Examination of the stochastic properties of individual time series indicate the need to 
characterize the dynamics of the relationship between producer and retail prices and the 
subsequent transfer of wealth between the economic agents participating in the coffee market. 
 
Prices Relationship and Rents Transferring  
The analysis above led to the conclusion that both producer and retail price series are 
I(1). According to Engle and Granger (1986), it is possible for a linear combination of these two 
series to be I(0) (i.e., stationary). In that case, the series are said to be cointegrated. Therefore, a 
restricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) is adequate. In this case the most appropriate is a Vector 
Error Correction (VEC) model because it allows for identification and testing of the long-run 
relationship between series as well as the dynamic adjustment towards equilibrium. Furthermore, 
the VEC model can be used to test for exogeinity to examine the capacity of producers to 
influence prices. The VEC model specification is as follows: 
   7 
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were IPt and RPt are international and retail prices respectively; γ  is the long-run relationship 
between price series; φ 1 and φ 2 are the adjustment coefficients; and ε 1 and ε 2 are the random 
errors. The cointegration test shown in Table 1 suggests the presence of one cointegrating 
equation since the trace value (119.06) is higher than the critical value (19.99). According to the 
test, the model does not have linear drift because the p-value for the chi-squared statistic does not 
allow rejecting the null of linear drift different from zero.  
 
Table 1. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Cointegration Rank (No linear drift in the process) 
Ho: Rank=r  HA: Rank>r  Eigenvalue  Trace  Critical Value   
0 0  0.3912  119.06  19.99   
1 1  0.0535  8.89  9.13  





Eigenvalue Chi-Square  DF  Prob>ChiSq 
0 0.3912  0.3892  0.88  2  0.6426 
1 0.0535  0.0527  0.20  1  0.6532 
 
 
Although these results are intuitive (i.e., retail and producer prices move together), the 
possibility of a long-run gap between producer and consumer prices would suggest continuous 
transfer of profits. The VEC model results presented in Table 2 contribute to examine the long-  8 
run relationship and the adjustment between retail and international prices. The long-run 
coefficients (1 and 1.157 for international and retail prices respectively) indicate that in the long-
run retail prices move away from international prices suggesting that transference of rents have 
occurred in coffee market. This divergence between international and consumer prices implied 
by a coefficient of 1.157 means that exporters obtained increasing profits throughout the period 
1982-2000. However, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient equals 
one or that the commercialization margin was constant. Adjustment coefficients imply that retail 
prices adjust to long-run patterns while international prices have a certain degree of exogeinity. 
In fact, the VEC model has a strong explanatory power for retail prices but not so for producer 
prices. 
 
Table 2. Vector Error Correction Model Parameter Estimates  







  Dependent Variable: Change in Price 
Variable  International Price (IP)  Retail Price (RP) 
   Intercept  0.118 (0.04)
a 0.244  (0.00) 
   Adjustment Coefficient
  0.067 (0.03)  0.134 (0.00) 
   ∆ IPt-1  0.148 (0.07)  0.276 (0.00) 
   ∆ RPt-1  0.016 (0.08)  0.347 (0.00) 
   R
2  0.088 0.495 
   Prob>F  0.000  0.000 
a Significance levels are in parenthesis. 
   9 
Results are different when the analysis is split into two periods (before and after 1990). 
Table 3 summarizes the long-run and adjustment coefficients for international and retail prices 
for the periods 1982-2000, 1982-1990 and 1990-2000. The first column is the results from Table 
2, the second shows the characteristics of price relationships during ICA and, for comparative 
purposes, the third shows the consequences of eliminating the export quota regime. The Table 
shows that coffee producers transferred their rents to traders after 1990 as indicated by a 
decreasing long-run relationship (0.81) between consumer and international prices. In contrast, 
international prices were an increasing fraction of retail prices during the period when the export 
quota system was in place (1.65). Note the evolution of the long-run coefficient for producer 
prices from 1.65 for the period 1982-1990 to 0.8 for 1990-2000. These findings suggest that after 
1990 the marketing margin increased so economic rents were transferred form producers to 
wholesalers. 
  
Table 3. Long-Run Parameters and Adjustment Coefficients at Different Periods 
Period 1982-2000  1982-1989  1990-2000 
  Long Run Parameters 
International Price  1  1  1 
Retail Price  -1.1574  -1.6562  -0.8097 
  Adjustment Coefficients 
International Price  0.0671  0.0529  0.1590 
Retail Price  0.1341  0.1225  0.3192 
 
 Exogeinity tests and Market Power 
Under ICA’s export quota system exporters operated under oligopolistic competition with 
price-setting power. From a time series perspective, producer prices were determined 
exogenously while retail prices were conditioned to movements in the supply side (endogenous).   10 
This fact is illustrated in Table 3 by the small adjustment coefficient of international prices (0.06) 
when compared with that for retail prices (0.13). Therefore, for the whole period of analysis, 
retail prices adjusted to changes in international prices.  This exogeinity means that producers 
had the ability to set prices and in turn wholesalers transferred price changes to consumers. 
However, splitting the series into two periods indicate substantial changes in the adjustment 
coefficients. Table 3 shows that after 1990, producer prices became highly responsive to market 
trends as expressed by the change in the adjustment coefficient from 0.05 to 0.16 for 1982-1989 
and 1990-2000 respectively. 
 
Table 4. Weak Exogeneity Tests Results 
  Probability > Chi Squared 
Period 1982-2000  1982-1989  1990-2000 
  International Price  0.0618  0.2207  0.0716 
  Retail price  0.0001  0.0008  0.0001 
 
A test of weak exogeinity helps to further demonstrate this conclusion. Table 4 reports 
the results showing the probability to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeinity for both 
series based upon the adjustment coefficients. For the period 1982-2000, evidence shows that at 
a 10% significance level, producers did not have the ability to set prices. However, dividing the 
series into two periods (before and after ICA’s elimination), the model results suggest that 
exporters set prices during the period 1982-1989, thus reflecting their market power. In contrast, 
for the period 1990-2000, they became price takers in the sense that prices are given exogenously 
to them. This change implies market power losses faced by producers after the coffee agreement 
breakdown. This finding, together with the fact that the stochastic process of retail prices did not   11 
change, support the hypothesis that the elimination of the export quota regime resulted in a 
transfer of economic rents from exporting countries to international wholesalers. 
 
Interpretation of Results Using a Framework of Imperfect Competition  
Findings of the time series models developed above can be interpreted in a theoretical 
framework of imperfect competition. The results suggest that coffee is a differentiated tradable 
good in an imperfect competitive market. Therefore, game theory can be applied to represent the 
behavior of economic agents participating in this market. The ICA export quota system is a 
collusion of producers associated with a Cournot model of imperfect competition. After 1990, 
however, a transition towards price competition took place. As a result, a Bertrand competition 
model is more appropriate to examine the international market for coffee after the elimination of 
the quota system.  
As in most agricultural products where producers are not directly involved in marketing, 
intermediaries play an important role in the export of commodities from developing countries. 
These international wholesalers influence the coffee market by adding value and making 
products available to consumers in importing countries. Furthermore, international wholesalers 
often form oligopolies able to influence quantities and prices in international markets. 
Consequently, if wholesalers agree to reduce supply, they can achieve higher profits through 
higher prices while maintaining their market shares. But there is also a relationship between 
wholesalers and producers given by prices. The higher the producer prices, the lower the 
wholesaler profits are because of constraints imposed by oligopolistic competition. The 
interaction between exporting countries and international wholesalers can be examined using a 
Bertrand competition scheme (Figure 2).   12 
 
Figure 2. Bertrand Model of Imperfect Competition 
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In Figure 2, the vertical axis represents the wholesaler price and the horizontal axis 
represents the producer price. Producer profits increase with the price received by its production, 
so the reaction curve for producers (c1) is downward sloping. Wholesaler profits increase with 
the retail price and with price negotiation with producers. Then the reaction curve (c2) is upward 
sloping. Equilibrium is reached where iso-benefit curves for both agents meet with the optimal 
prices conditioned to the other agent’s decision is at point E. Note that profits to both producers 
and wholesalers increase when the reaction curve c1 shifts to the right. 
If producers set prices beyond this equilibrium then wholesaler profits decrease. If 
wholesaler prices increase moving from iso-profit curve p11 to p12, an increase in production 
takes place (a shift in the reaction curve to c1’) leading to welfare gains from employment and 
income. These welfare gains are independent of the rate of profits, which can change and lead to 
re-distribution of welfare between economic agents. This uncertain outcome comes from the new 
iso-profit curve (p22) associated to the resultant reaction curve (c1’). Furthermore, region Y in   13 
Figure 2 shows that it is possible to increase profits for both agents through price and/or output 
agreements. This was the case of ICA, which was an export quota regime supported by 
importing countries for political reasons. 
The findings suggest that exporting countries lost market power after 1990, when coffee 
producers became price-takers in international markets. Since they could not continue to 
influence prices, the reaction curve of producers is vertical and there is not an expansion path for 
their profits (Figure 3). In this context, the alternative for exporting countries to increase their 
profits is to shift their reaction curve, which implies either technological improvement or market 
share gains. For wholesalers however, it is possible to increase profits by lowering producer 
prices without sacrificing market share. 
 
Figure 3. Bertrand Model Illustrating Exporting Countries’ loss of market power 
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Note that in region Y (Figure 3), wholesalers can increase profits (along reaction curve 
c2) without changing the profit for producers by moving from the iso-profit curve p2 to p’2 
without changing producer’s iso-profit p1, or can even improve the producer price for higher 
profit levels. However, oligopolistic competition limits the wholesaler’s price-setting capability   14 
and the equilibrium stays at point E. Therefore, reductions are more likely than increases in 
producer prices. Furthermore, long-run changes in prices or in marginal revenue of the firms 
might shift the wholesaler’s reaction curve to the left. In that case, the wholesaler can obtain all 
the benefits of such shift by moving to the iso-profit curve p’2 while holding producer prices 
fixed at p1*. The model’s results favor the representation in Figure 3. 
This relationship between wholesalers and producers may be presented analytically as 
p1 = α 0 - α 1 x1 + α 2 x2      (2a) 
p2 = β 0 - β 1 x2 - β 2 x1                  (2b),   
where p1 is the producer price, p2 is the retail price, x1 and x2 are production and retail sales 
respectively. Increases in output reduce prices as measured by the price elasticity α 1. Producers’ 
behavior is different from that of the wholesaler because higher demand levels positively affect 
the producer prices as measured by α 2.  In the second equation, β 0 represents the long-run retail 
price and β 1 represents price elasticity of demand. β 2 is the cross price elasticity in the 
international market and provides a measure of producer’s market power.
4 
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4 β 2 shows the ability of producers influence prices and can be associated with negotiation 
power.   15 
Note that in the case of producer prices above the equilibrium, wholesalers transmit the 




β . In contrast, 
producers face lower prices when market prices deviate from the long-run equilibrium. This is 
due to both, the lower quantity demanded because of higher prices as well as the unilateral 
scheme of profit transmission from wholesalers to producers established in this model. 
Consequently, producers experience the impact of depressions in quantities and do not have the 
ability to affect prices.  
The empirical model supports this framework of analysis. The cointegration tests indicate 
that that the system moves towards the long-run equilibrium (point E in Figure 3). The slow 
adjustment of international prices implies that α 2 / β 1 →  0 and thus the reaction curve resembles 
a vertical line, which validates the analysis above. Furthermore, exogeneity tests indicate that 




This study uses time series techniques to identify structural changes in international 
markets of agricultural commodities. These techniques might be an attractive alternative relative 
to structural models when data is scarce and when prices satisfy certain stochastic conditions 
such as the presence of cointegrated series. The benefits of using a VEC model, which is a 
restricted type of VAR models, are that it allows for the identification of the long-run 
relationship between price time series and for examining the process of adjustment towards the   16 
equilibrium. Additionally, the paper showed how the results obtained from time series analysis 
can be interpreted in a Bertrand model of imperfect competition. 
Time series techniques were applied to examine changes in the international coffee 
market resulting from the elimination of the export quota agreement in 1990. The findings show 
that the stochastic process of price formation did change after 1990. Furthermore, the VEC 
model estimators indicate that the long-run gap between retail and producer prices have 
increased.  Additionally, tests of weak exogeineity for producer prices indicate that exporting 
countries lost market power after 1990. Changes in formation of international prices, increased 
marketing margins and loss of market power suggest the occurrence of welfare re-distribution 
from coffee exporting countries to international wholesalers.  
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